Another surprising omission was during Thursday’s testimony from Boeing engineer Mark Negley. For nearly a decade, Mr. Negley conducted preliminary design studies for Titan and supported Oceangate with test equipment and advice. He testified about the challenges of building carbon fiber structures.
The committee did not question Mr. Negley about sending an email to Rush in 2018 sharing an analysis based on information provided by Rush. “We believe there is a high risk of serious failure at or below 4,000 meters,” he wrote. The email included a diagram showing a skull and crossbones near that depth.
Many red flags, few solid answers
This week also included technical testimony from other expert witnesses regarding submarine design and classification. Ocean Gate’s decision to operate the Titan using a new carbon fiber hull with little testing and relying on an unproven acoustic monitoring system to obtain raw information about the hull’s integrity included: All were either skeptical or outright critical.
“Momentary delamination or collapse can occur within a millisecond,” testified Roy Thomas of the U.S. Bureau of Shipping. “Real-time monitoring was not able to capture this.”
Donald Kramer, a materials engineer with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), testified that the composite hull had manufacturing defects. He explained that Titan’s remains had layers of carbon fiber shedding away to accommodate its multi-tiered structure, but did not offer an opinion on what caused the implosion.
Neither the hull manufacturer nor Ocean Gate’s engineering director at the time of construction were called to testify.
MBI Chairman Jason Neubauer said at a press conference after the hearing. “It is not necessary to obtain testimony from all witnesses. As long as we have factual information and data from the company through forensic investigation and from other witnesses, we may not interview all identified witnesses. .”
Kramer pointed out that data from 2022, when an explosion was heard after Titanic surfaced after its dive, showed an alarming change in the strain of the ship’s hull. Phil Brooks, Ocean Gate’s then-director of engineering, testified that he was probably not qualified to analyze the data, and that Rush personally removed the submarine for its final dive.
Over the past two weeks, multiple witnesses have testified about Rush’s primary role in driving business, engineering and operational decisions, as well as his acerbic personality and temper. Matthew McCoy, a 2017 Ocean Gate engineer and former Coast Guard employee, testified today about a conversation he had with Rush about Titan’s registration and inspection.
Mr. McCoy recalled Mr. Rush saying that if the Coast Guard became a problem, “you could just buy the legislators and the problem would go away.” McCoy filed his notice the next day.
what happens next
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Coast Guard’s MBI will begin preparing its final report. This may include determining the definitive cause of the fatal accident, referral for criminal investigation, and recommendations for future policy or regulation.
Titan’s hull and viewport featured prominently in expert testimony regarding the potential physical causes of the implosion. Regardless of which component ultimately failed, witnesses are pointing fingers at everyone from the designers and manufacturers to the decision-making of Ocean Gate’s operations team and management. This can make it difficult to pinpoint a single cause or identify the individuals responsible, other than Stockton Rush.
